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Abstract
In this note, we analyze a sequentially rationalizable choice model with a transi-
tive rationale and a standard preference. The model in this note is more restrictive
than the Rational Shortlist Method (RSM) model which is proposed in Manzini and
Mariotti (2007) to capture cyclic behavior. Yet, a decision maker in our model exhibits
cyclic behavior in general. We prove that the cyclicity of an indirectly revealed pref-
erence is exactly what distinguishes the RSM framework (a sequential choice model
with a non-standard preference) from our transitive-RSM framework (a sequential
choice model with a standard preference). We also provide a partial identification
result on the representation.
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There is a growing literature that models behavioral anomalies resulting from in-
ternal conflict. In a seminal paper, Manzini and Mariotti (2007) propose a sequentially
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rationalizable choice model that accommodates cyclic choice behavior, which is common
anomaly observed in experiments.1) The objective of this note is to analyze the gap that
exists between standard choice theory and the sequential choice model in Manzini and
Mariotti (2007), which they term the rational shortlist method (RSM) model.
A decision maker (DM) in the RSM framework has two rationales. She departs from
the standard theory in the following respects: (i) the DM uses her first rationale to form
a shortlist, from which she makes her final choice using the second rationale; (ii.a) the
DM’s first rationale may be intransitive; and (ii.b) the DM’s second rationale may be
cyclic.2) The RSM model encompasses at least two interpretations: a) the first rationale
can be interpreted as the DM’s (potentially incomplete) underlying strict preference, and
the second as the “tie-breaking rule,” and b) the first rationale can be interpreted as some
selection criterion that the DM deems important; and the second rationale as the DM’s
underlying preference. Hence, an RSM choice function is observationally equivalent to
the standard choice function if the first rationale is a complete strict preference (under
interpretation a)), or if the first rationale is empty and the second rationale is a complete
strict preference (under interpretation b)). Whichever interpretation is employed, a
non-standard preference is permitted in the RSM framework. Therefore, behavioral
anomalies that are identified in the RSM framework may be the result of the procedure
by which a shortlist is created before the final decision is made, or a non-standard
preference, or a combination of the two.
In this note, we employ interpretation b). In our model, which we call a transitive-
RSM model, while (i) the DM still forms a shortlist before making the final choice,
(ii.a’) her first rationale (her criterion) is transitive, and (ii.b’) her second rationale (her
preference) is complete and transitive. Therefore, our model departs from the standard
choice model only if the DM’s criterion is neither empty nor complete. Since a shortlist
1)For example, in the experiment conducted by Loomes et al. (1991), out of 200 subjects, 128 subjects
exhibited some form of cyclic choice. Also see Tversky (1972) and Starmer and Sugden (1998).
2)In general, there are multiple pairs of rationales that sequentially rationalize an RSM choice function.
However, some RSM choice functions can be sequentially rationalized only by a cyclic second rationale.
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is formed if and only if the criterion is nonempty, any behavioral anomalies in our model
must result from the presumption that the DM forms a shortlist.
Conditions (ii.a’) and (ii.b’) are imposed in order to keep the departure of our model
from the standard theory minimal. We find these are reasonable assumptions. The reason
for imposing condition (ii.a’) is the following. Transitivity of the criterion requires that if
y beats x, then x can never matter to any set containing y. In other words, the shortlists
from S and S\ {x} have to be identical whenever an alternative x is not in the shortlist
from a choice set S (that contains x and y). Condition (ii.b’) is equivalent to requiring
that the underlying preference is a standard (strict) preference.3)
Our representation theorem (Theorem 1) shows that an RSM model is behaviorally
different from a transitive-RSM model if and only if one axiom, which we call the
axiom of No Binary Chain Cycles (NBCC), is violated. Our second result (Theorem 2)
identifies the set of criterion-preference pairs that rationalize a given choice function. We
then identify the condition on the choice function under which the criterion-preference
representation is unique (Corollary 1).
Our note is closely related to Cherepanov et al. (2008). Like our note, the DM in their
paper forms a shortlist, and then makes a choice according to a standard preference over
alternatives. Unlike our note, however, the DM has multiple criteria, and the shortlist
consists of all alternatives that are maximal with respect to at least one of the criteria.
They introduce an axiom which imposes acyclicity on the revealed preference, and then
show that the axiom completely characterizes choice behavior that arises from their
model. The notion of the revealed preference in their paper is similar to but independent
from ours. As a result, their axiom is neither weaker nor stronger than our NBCC axiom.
Nevertheless, it can be easily verified that their axiom is implied by our NBCC axiom
and the Weak WARP introduced in Manzini and Mariotti (2007).
3)Another reason for studying a restrictive sequential choice model is that if we do not get a unique
representation, or comparative static result in this most restrictive class, we never get them in a more
general model.
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Other related papers include Aspesteguia and Ballester (2009), Garcı´a-Sanz and Al-
cantud (2010), and Manzini and Mariotti (2010). In contrast to our note, all these works
generalize the original model in Manzini and Mariotti (2007).
Aspesteguia and Ballester (2009) consider a sequential choice model with acyclic
rationales. They axiomatize the choice behavior of a DM who employs a sequence of
incomplete and acyclic rationales to eliminate alternatives from the choice set until she
reaches a unique element, which is her final choice. Their axiom is about the existence
of a binary selector (a function that selects a binary choice problem from an arbitrary
choice problem) that satisfies a consistency requirement. In contrast, our set of axioms is
directly imposed on the choice function, and therefore is easily comparable with axioms
in other papers.
Manzini and Mariotti (2010) analyze a choice model in which a choice is induced by
the sequential application of semiorders.4) They show that the model restricts choice
data the same way as the sequential choice model with an arbitrary number of acyclic
rationales on any finite domain. The transitive-RSM model proposed here can thus be
viewed as a special case of their model when the domain is finite. Finally, Garcı´a-Sanz
and Alcantud (2010) characterize choice correspondences that can be rationalized by the
sequential application of two relations.
1 Basic Definitions
Consider an arbitrary non-empty finite set X with |X| ≥ 3. The set of choice problems is
ΩX ≡ 2X\ {∅}. A choice function on X is defined as any function c : ΩX → X with c (S) ∈ S
for all S ∈ ΩX. The decision maker (DM) has an asymmetric, complete, and transitive
(strong) preference relation P2 ∈ X × X. We denote the P2-maximum element of S by
c2 (S; P2). A criterion is an asymmetric and transitive binary relation, P1 ⊂ X × X. We
call the set of P1-maximal elements of S, max (S; P1) ≡
{
x ∈ S : @y s.th. yP1x
}
, the shortlist
4)A semiorder is a transitive binary relation. See Luce (1956) for the definition.
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from S. For notational convenience, we denote c2 (max (S; P1) ; P2) by c(P1,P2) (S).
Definition 1 A choice function c is a transitive rational shortlistmethod (transitive-RSM)
if there exists a pair of criterion and preference (P1, P2) such that c (S) = c(P1,P2) (S) for all S ∈ ΩX.
The DM in our model makes a choice using the following procedure. First, she uses
the criterion P1 to eliminate all inferior alternatives and get a shortlist. (Formally, she
eliminates y ∈ S if and only if there exists an x ∈ S such that xP1y). Then she picks an
alternative from the shortlist using her preference P2.
To facilitate discussion, the following definitions and results from Manzini and Mar-
iotti (2007) are restated. In Manzini and Mariotti (2007), an asymmetric binary relation
on X × X is called a rationale.
Definition 2 (Manzini and Mariotti (2007)) A choice function c is a rational shortlist
method (RSM) if there exist two rationales P1 and P2 such that c (S) = c2 (max (S; P1) ; P2). The
pair (P1, P2) is said to sequentially rationalize c.
Manzini and Mariotti (2007) show that a choice function c is an RSM if and only if c
satisfies the following two axioms:
Weak WARP Suppose x = c
({
x, y
})
, and x = c (S) for some S 3 x, y. Then for any T such
that
{
x, y
} ⊂ T ⊂ S, c (T) , y.
Expansion If x = c (S) = c (T), then x = c (S ∪ T).
While a transitive-RSM requires transitivity for both P1 and P2 (and completeness for
P2), an RSM requires transitivity for neither P1 nor P2. Therefore, a transitive-RSM choice
function is an RSM choice function, but not vice versa. Nevertheless, a transitive-RSM
choice function permits cyclic choice behavior, as shown by the following example.
Example 1 Suppose X =
{
x, y, z
}
, c (X) = x, c
({
x, y
})
= x, c
({
y, z
})
= y, and c ({x, z}) = z.
Then the following pair of (P1, P2) rationalizes the choice function c: P1 =
{(
y, z
)}
and P2 ={
(z, x) ,
(
x, y
)
,
(
z, y
)}
. Therefore c is a transitive-RSM choice function.
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1.1 Revealed Preference
Suppose a DM in our model chooses x over y from
{
x, y
}
, i.e. x = c
({
x, y
})
. There are
three possible explanations for this choice: (i) x ranks above y in her criterion P1 and x
is preferred to y according to P2; (ii) x ranks above y in her criterion P1 but y is preferred
to x according to P2; and (iii) x neither dominates or is dominated by y in P1, but x is
preferred to y in P2.
If (i) or (ii) is the reason for x = c
({
x, y
})
, then the DM’s shortlists from choice sets
S 3 x, y and S\ {y} coincide. Therefore, S and S\ {y} induce the same choice. On the other
hand, if (iii) is the explanation for x = c
({
x, y
})
, then the DM’s shortlists from S 3 x, y and
S\ {y} may be different. As a result, the choices from S and S\ {y} may be different. Hence,
if we observe c (S) , c
(
S\ {y}) for some S 3 x, y, we may conclude that the alternative x is
revealed as being preferred to y. The above discussion yields the following definitions.5)
Definition 3 We say x is directly revealed preferred to y, which is denoted as x cD y, if and
only if c
({
x, y
})
= x but c (S) , c
(
S\ {y}) for some S 3 x, y.
Definition 4 A set S = {x1, ..., xn} is called a binary chain when xk cD xk+1 for all k ≤ n − 1.
Definition 5 We say x1 is indirectly revealed preferred to xn, which is denoted as x1 cI xn, if
and only if there exists {x2, ..., xn−1} such that {x1, ..., xn} is a binary chain.
Suppose {x1, ..., xn, x1} is a binary chain. Then x1 is indirectly revealed preferred to x1.
5)Our notion of the revealed preference is similar to the one in Masatlioglu et al. (2010). They consider
a choice model in which the DM is characterized by two unobservables: (i) her underlying preference,
and (ii) an attention filter which reduces every choice set to a subset called a consideration set to which
preferences are applied. The DM may select an alternative x in the presence of y even when the DM
prefers y because y is not in the consideration set. In their framework, the underlying preference and the
attention filter can be recovered if the following choice behavior is observed: c (S) = x for some S 3 x, y
but c
(
S\ {y}) , c (S). This can happen only when her consideration set has changed, i.e., y must have been
considered in S (revealed attention). Also, the fact that x is chosen while y is also in the consideration set
implies that x should be revealed preferred to y (revealed preference).
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In other words, some cyclic choices can only be explained by cyclic preference relations.
To minimize the departure from the standard model, we impose the following axiom.6)
NBCC A choice function c satisfies No Binary Chain Cycles Axiom (NBCC) if there
does not exist any binary chain {x1, ..., xn} such that x1 = xn.
Note that NBCC does NOT rule out cyclic choice behavior. It only rules out choice
functions that reveal a cyclic preference relation. As the following example shows, It is
violated by some RSM. As we shall show below, NBCC is the axiom that distinguishes
a transitive-RSM choice function from an RSM choice function.
Example 2 Suppose X =
{
w, x, y, z
}
; and c−1 (w) =
{{w, x} , {w, x, y}}, c−1 (x) = {{x, y} , {x, y, z} , X},
c−1
(
y
)
=
{{
y, z
}
,
{
w, y
}
,
{
w, y, z
}}
, and c−1 (z) = {{x, z} , {w, z} , {w, x, z}}. Then c is an RSM
choice function.7) We have x cD y because x = c
({
x, y
})
and c
({
x, y, z
})
= x , z = c ({x, z}).
Similarly, w cD x because w = c ({w, x}) and c
({
w, x, y
})
= w , y = c
({
w, y
})
. Also, y cD w
because y = c
({
w, y
})
and c
({
w, x, y
})
= w , x = c
({
x, y
})
. Therefore, the directly revealed
preference exhibits a cycle, thus violating NBCC.
2 Main Results
Now we are ready to state our first main result:
Theorem 1 An RSM choice function c is a transitive-RSM choice function if and only if c
satisfies NBCC.
Proof. In Appendix.
The ”if” part of the proof to 1 is constructive. Given an RSM choice function c that
satisfies NBCC, we define Pc2 as a completion of cI , and Pc1 as follows:
Pc1 ≡
{(
x, y
)
: c (S) = c
(
S\ {y}) for any S 3 x, y with x , y} . (2.1)
6)We think that the axiom is natural because under our interpretation, the second rationale is a strict
preference relation. It is therefore reasonable to impose acyclicity on it.
7)c is sequentially rationalized by P1 =
{(
x, y
)
,
(
y, z
)
, (z, w)
}
and P2 =
{(
y, w
)
, (w, x) , (z, x)
}
.
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Then, it is not difficult to see that both Pc1 and P
c
2 are asymmetric and transitive. The
key part of the proof is to show that the pair
(
Pc1, P
c
2
)
represents the choice function c, i.e.,
c(Pc1,Pc2) (S) = c (S) for all S.
Remark 1 It can be shown that Pc1 in (2.1) satisfies P
c
1 = {
(
x, y
)
: c
({
w, x, y, z
})
= c ({w, x, z})
for any w, z ∈ X, AND x , y}. Therefore, the criterion can be constructed by observing all choice
behavior from choice sets of size 4 or less. Recall that in Manzini and Mariotti (2007), the first
rationale was constructed as follows: xPc1y if and only if y , c (S) for all S 3 x, y. Therefore, we
need much less information to construct Pc1.
Next, we discuss the identification problem of our representation. A few definitions
are required. For a transitive-RSM choice function c, we denote Pc1 defined in (2.1) by P
c
1.
In addition, defineP (c) ≡ {(P1, P2) : c(P1,P2) (S) = c (S)},Pi (c) ≡ {Pi : (P1, P2) ∈ P (c) for some P j , Pi},
and P2 (P1; c) ≡ {P2 : (P1, P2) ∈ P (c)}.
Theorem 2 Let c be a transitive-RSM choice function. Define Pc1 ≡
{(
x, y
) ∈ Pc1 : y cI x}. We
have (i) Pc1, P
c
1 ∈ P1 (c); (ii) for all Pc1 ∈ P1 (c), (ii.a) Pc1 ⊂ Pc1 ⊂ P
c
1, and (ii.b) P2
(
Pc1; c
)
⊂
P2
(
Pc1, c
)
⊂ P2
(
P
c
1, c
)
and
∣∣∣∣P2 (Pc1; c)∣∣∣∣ = 1.
Proof. In Appendix.
Parts (i) and (ii.a) of Theorem 2 identify the tight upper and lower bounds for the
criterion Pc1. The upper bound tells us when a particular alternative makes some other
alternatives irrelevant to the choice. To be precise, whenever c (S) = c
(
S\ {y}) for all
S 3 x, y, we have xPc1y.
The lower bound captures the “conflict” between the upper bound and the indirectly
revealed preference.8) Even if y is irrelevant to the final choice whenever x is in the choice
set (i.e., xP
c
1y), y may be indirectly revealed preferred to x (i.e., y cI x). Whenever this is
the case, we have xPc1y.
Part (ii.b) says that a less complete Pc1 imposes more restrictions on P
c
2 in the task of
rationalizing the choice function. In particular, when the tight lower bound Pc1 is used,
8)When a choice function c satisfies WARP, Pc1 = ∅, while P
c
1 is a linear order.
8
there is a unique preference that rationalizes the choice function. An immediate corollary
of Theorem 2 is the following.
Corollary 1 The preference is point-identified if and only if the criterion is point-identified, i.e.,
|P2 (c)| = 1 if and only if Pc1 = P
c
1. Therefore, a transitive-RSM choice function c has a unique
criterion-preference representation if and only if c (S) = c
(
S\ {y}) for all S 3 x, y implies y cI x.
Remark 2 (Behavioral Comparative) Suppose there are two transitive-RSM choice func-
tions, ci and c j, and they are uniquely represented by
(
Pci1 , P
ci
2
)
and
(
Pc j1 , P
c j
2
)
respectively. Suppose
further that Pci1 ⊂ Pc j1 and Pci2 = Pc j2 . In other words, c j exhibits more “conflicts” between the
criterion and the preference. Given that an RSM choice function violates WARP if and only if it
exhibits cycles (Theorem 2 in Manzini and Mariotti (2007)), one may expect c j to exhibit “more
cyclic behaviors” than ci. However, as the following example shows, this conjecture turns out to
be false.
Example 3 Suppose that X =
{
w, x, y, z
}
and DM-i and DM-j have the following pair of
criteria and preferences: Pci1 : xP
i
1z, yP
i
1w, yP
i
1z; P
ci
2 : zP
i
2wP
i
2xP
i
2y; P
c j
1 : xP
j
1z, yP
j
1w; and
Pc j2 : zP
i
2wP
i
2xP
i
2y. Consider c
i = c(Pci1 ,Pci2 ), and c j = c(Pcj1 ,Pcj2 ). Then Pc
i
1 = P
ci
1 ! P
c j
1 = P
c j
1 , and
Pci2 = P
c j
2 . Nevertheless, both c
i and c j exhibit two cycles of length 3, and one cycle of length 4.
Moreover, the cycles of length 4 by ci and c j are different.
3 Conclusion
The contribution of this note is twofold. First, we show that even with a standard
preference, the DM in general exhibits cyclic behavior if she uses the shortlist method
to make her decision. We prove that the cyclicity of indirectly revealed preference is
exactly what distinguishes the RSM framework (a sequential choice model with a non-
standard preference), from the transitive-RSM framework (a sequential choice model
with a standard preference) that is proposed here.
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Second, we provide a partial identification result on the representation. In general,
there are multiple pairs of criteria and preferences that rationalize a transitive-RSM choice
function. Our partial identification result provides the tight bounds of the criterion and
the preference representations, as well as the necessary and sufficient condition on the
choice function for a unique criterion-preference representation.
4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We say that a choice function c satisfies Weak-IIA if the following condition is met.
Weak-IIA Let
{
x, y
} ⊂ T ⊂ S. If x = c (S) and y = c (T), then there exists a z ∈ S\T such
that c (U) = c
(
U\ {y}) for all U 3 y, z.9)
As an intermediate step, we prove the following lemma. By following lemma, The-
orem 1 follows if we show that a choice function c is a transitive-RSM if and only if c
satisfies Weak-IIA and NBCC.
Lemma 1 Suppose a choice function c satisfies NBCC. Then c satisfies Weak-IIA if and only if
c is an RSM.
Proof. (The “only if” part) We show that Weak-IIA implies Weak WARP. Suppose
x = c
({
x, y
})
= c (S) for S 3 x, y, and c (T) = y for some T such that {x, y} ⊂ T ⊂ S. Given
that x = c
({
x, y
})
and y = c (T), there exists a z ∈ T\ {x, y} such that c (U) = c (U\ {x}) for
all U 3 x, z. This contradicts c (S) = x, because x, z ∈ S.
9)Weak-IIA says the following. Suppose x and y are available in two choice sets S and T, where T ⊂ S.
In addition, suppose the DM chooses x from S, but switches to y when she faces T. Then in a sequential
choice framework, a natural interpretation is that there is an alternative z which is in S but not T, and
such a z leads the DM not to consider y. When the DM faces T, such a z is not present, and therefore she
considers y. If this is the case, the alternative y should be irrelevant to the DM whenever z is available.
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Next, we show that Weak-IIA implies Expansion. Assume that x = c (S) = c (T) but
y = c (S ∪ T) , x, by contradiction. Then by Weak-IIA, and x = c (S) , c (S ∪ T) = y,
we know that there exists a z ∈ T such that c (U) = c (U\ {x}) for all U 3 x, z. This is a
contradiction because x, z ∈ T and therefore c (T) = x , c (T\ {x}).
(The “if” part) To show the “if” part, we define the following notion first. A choice
function c is said to satisfy Reduction Axiom if the following property is satisfied: when
x = c (S) and y = c (T) for S and T such that
{
x, y
} ⊂ T ⊂ S: there exists a z ∈ S\T such that
c
({
x, y, z
})
= x, c ({x, z}) = x, c ({y, z}) = z, and c ({x, y}) = y.
Claim 1 Weak WARP, Expansion, and NBCC together imply Reduction.
Proof. Suppose there are S and T such that x = c (S), y = c (T) and
{
x, y
} ⊂ T ⊂ S. We first define
the following sets: T′ ≡ T∪{z ∈ S : c ({y, z}) = y}, S′ ≡ T′∪{z ∈ S : c ({x, z}) = z or c ({x, y, z}) = x}.
Note that T ⊂ T′ ⊂ S′ ⊂ S by construction. Furthermore, define Z ≡ S′\T′ and Z′ ≡
{z ∈ Z : c ({x, z}) = x} ⊂ Z.
We make the following observations: (i) c
({
x, y
})
= y and y cD x; (ii) y = c (T′); and (iii)
x = c (S′).
To see (i), note that x = c (S) and y = c (T) together with Weak WARP imply c
({
x, y
})
= y.
Then c (S) = x implies y cD x. To see (ii), note that y = c (T), and c
({
y, z
})
= y for all
z ∈ T′\T. Therefore, y = c (T′) follows from Expansion. To see (iii), fix any z ∈ S\S′, we
have c
({
y, z
})
= z, c ({x, z}) = x and c ({x, y, z}) , x. By Weak WARP, c ({x, y, z}) , z because
c ({x, z}) = x and c (S) = x. Therefore, we have c ({x, y, z}) = y. Moreover, c ({y, z}) = z
and c ({x, z}) , c ({x, y, z}) implies that z cD y. Observation (i) and NBCC imply ¬ (x cD z).
However, we have c ({x, z}) = x. Therefore, for all U 3 x, z, we have c (U) = c (U\z). This gives
x = c (S′).
Take any z ∈ Z′. By the definition of Z′, we have c ({x, z}) = x and c ({x, y, z}) = x. By
definitions of T′, and Z′, we have c ({y, z}) = z. By observation (i), we have c ({x, y}) = y.
Therefore, the proof is complete if we can show that Z′ is non-empty.
Suppose Z′ = ∅. Given that c satisfies Weak WARP and Expansion, c is sequentially
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rationalizable. Let
(
Pc1, P
c
2
)
be a pair of rationales that sequentially rationalizes the choice.10) For
all z ∈ Z, c ({x, z}) = z implies that either zPc1x or zPc2x. Similarly, for all z ∈ Z, c
({
y, z
})
= z
implies that either zPc1y or zP
c
2y. Therefore, we have c
({
x, y
} ∪ Z′′) , x, y for all Z′′ ⊂ Z.
Let Z0 = Z, and Zn+1 = Zn\ {zn}, where zn = c ({x, y} ∪ Zn). Note that zn , x, y for all n.
Then observation (iii) implies that there is a w ∈ T′ such that wPc1z0. Therefore, c (T′ ∪ {z0}) =
c (T′). Define Tn+1 = Tn ∪ {zn} with T0 = T′. Then a similar argument yields c (Tn+1) =
c (Tn) = c (T′). Given that S′ is finite, we have c (S′) = c
(
T|Z|−1
)
= c (T′). This contradicts with
observations (ii) and (iii) above.
Claim 2 Reduction and NBCC imply Weak-IIA.
Proof. Suppose there is a set x = c (S) and y = c (T) for some S, T such that
{
x, y
} ⊂ T ⊂ S. Note
that by Reduction, there exists a z ∈ S\T such that c ({x, y, z}) = x, c ({x, z}) = x, c ({y, z}) = z,
and c
({
x, y
})
= y. Hence, we have y cD x cD z. If there exists a U such that c (U) , c
(
U\ {y})
and y, z ∈ U, then z cD y, which violates NBCC.
By Lemma 1, we are done if we show that a choice function c is a transitive-RSM if
and only if c satisfies Weak-IIA and NBCC.
(The “if” part) The proof is constructive. The criterion is the following: let Pc1 ≡{(
x, y
)
: c (S) = c
(
S\ {y}) for all S 3 x, y and x , y}. Next, we define Pc2 as a completion of
cI . Note that by Szpilrajn’s Theorem, such a completion exists. Below, we show that
both Pc1 and P
c
2 are asymmetric and transitive. Then, we show that c(Pc1,Pc2) (S) = c (S).
First, we argue that the binary relation Pc1 is asymmetric and transitive. That P
c
1 is
asymmetric follows from the definition of Pc1 together with the single valuedness of c
and the assumption of full domain. To see that Pc1 is transitive, assume xP
c
1y and yP
c
1z.
The proof is complete if we show c (S) = (S\ {z}) for all S 3 x, z. Take an arbitrary set
10)The existence of such
(
Pc1, P
c
2
)
is guaranteed because c satisfies Weak WARP and Expansion (Theorem
1 in Manzini and Mariotti (2007)).
12
S 3 x, z. First, suppose that y ∈ S. Then by yPc1z, we have c (S) = c (S\ {z}). Next, suppose
y < S. We know that c
(
S ∪ {y} \ {z}) = c (S ∪ {y}) by yPc1z, and c (S ∪ {y}) = c (S) by xPc1y.
In addition, xPc1y implies c
(
S ∪ {y} \ {z}) = c (S\ {z}). Hence, we have c (S) = c (S\ {z}).
Next, we show that the binary relation Pc2 is asymmetric and transitive. This is
straightforward due to the fact that cI is asymmetric by NBCC, so is Pc2.
Lastly, we show c (S) = c(Pc1,Pc2) (S) for all S. Suppose x = c (S). First, we show that
x ∈ max
(
S; Pc1
)
. If not, then there is a y such that yPc1x, and therefore c (S) = c (S\ {x}),
which is a contradiction. Next, we show that x cI y for all y ∈ max
(
S; Pc1
)
. If not, then
for some y ∈ max
(
S; Pc1
)
, we have y = c
({
x, y
})
. Then weak-IIA implies that z ∈ S\ {x, y}
such that zPc1y, which contradicts y ∈ max
(
S; Pc1
)
.
(The “only if” part) Suppose c is a transitive-RSM, and c (S) = c(Pc1,Pc2) (S) for some(
Pc1, P
c
2
)
. If x cD y, then xPc2y. Therefore, the completeness and the transitivity of Pc2 imply
NBCC. Next, suppose x = c (S) and y = c (T) for
{
x, y
} ⊂ T ⊂ S. It is straightforward to
check x ∈ max
(
S; Pc1
)
, y < max
(
S; Pc1
)
, and x, y ∈ c
(
T; Pc1
)
.
Therefore, there exists z ∈ S\T such that zPc1y and xPc2z. By transitivity of Pc1, we have
zPc1w for all w such that yP
c
1w. Hence, c (U) = c
(
U\ {y}) for all U 3 y, z. Q.E.D.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of (i): P
c
1 ∈ P1 (c) follows immediately from Theorem 1. To show Pc1 ∈ P1 (c), we
show that the transitive closure P˜c2 of cD ∪P
c
1\Pc1 is asymmetric.
First, we define a P˜c2-cycle of length n as a sequence {xi}ni=0 that satisfies the following:
(i) for all i, xi cD xi+1, or xci P˜c1xi+1, where P˜c1 ≡ P
c
1\Pc1; (ii) xi , x j for all i, j , 0, n with i , j;
and (iii) xn = x0. Because of NBCC, we can assume x0P˜c1x1, and x1 cD x2 without loss of
generality. To complete the proof, we only need to show that P˜c2-cycles do not exist for
all n ≥ 3. We proceed by induction.
Suppose n = 3. Because x0P˜c1x1, we must have x2 cD x0. Otherwise, x2 = c ({x0, x2})
implies x2P
c
1x0, and then x2P
c
1x1, a contradiction. Then together with x1 cD x2, we have
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x1 cI x0, which contradicts x0P˜c1x1. Therefore, P˜c2-cycles of length 3 do not exist.
Next, assume that there do not exist any P˜c2-cycles of length shorter than m. We need
to show that P˜c2-cycle of length m does not exist.
Observe first that x0 = c ({x0, x2}) because of an argument similar to the case n = 3.
There are three possibilities: (i) x0 cD x2; (ii) x0P˜c1x2; or (iii) x0Pc1x2. If either (i) or (ii)
holds, then {x0, x2, · · · , xm} is a P˜c2-cycle of length m − 1. This contradicts the induction
hypothesis. Suppose (iii) holds. Then, by definition of Pc1, we have x2 cI x0. Together
with x1 cD x2, we have x1 cI x0, by the definition of cI . But x1 cI x0 contradicts x0P˜c1x1.
Let P˜c′2 be a completion of P˜
c
2, which exists by Szpilrajn’s Theorem. Since P
c
1 is transitive
by construction, it is straightforward to see
(
Pc1, P˜
c′
2
)
∈ P (c).
Proof of (ii): Let
(
Pc1, P
c
2
)
∈ P (c).
(ii.a) Recall that xP
c
1y if and only if c (S) = c
(
S\ {y}) for all S 3 x, y and x , y. Therefore,
Pc1 ⊂ P
c
1.
Now we show Pc1 ⊂ Pc1. First note that cD⊂ Pc2. This is because x cD y if and only if
x = c
({
x, y
})
, and c (S) , c
(
S\ {y}) for some S 3 x, y. If xPc1y, then c (S) = c (S\ {y}) for all
S 3 x, y, and hence, x cD y implies xPc2y, i.e., cD⊂ Pc2.
Suppose xP1y but ¬
(
xPc1y
)
. Note xP1y if and only if x = c
({
x, y
})
and there exists a
sequence {zi}ni=1 such that y cD z1 cD · · · cD zn cD x. Therefore, xP1y implies yPc2x for any
Pc2 ∈ P2 (c). However, ¬
(
xPc1y
)
and x = c
({
x, y
})
imply xPc2y, a contradiction.
(ii.b) Suppose Pc1 ⊂ Pc′1 , and Pc1, Pc′1 ∈ P1 (c). The proof is complete if we show
P2
(
Pc1, c
)
⊂ P2
(
Pc′1 , c
)
.
Pick some Pc2 ∈ P2
(
Pc1, c
)
. It suffices to show that
(
Pc′1 , P
c
2
)
∈ P (c). Fix a choice set S and
let x = c (S). Then x ∈ max
(
S; Pc′1
)
⊂ max
(
S; Pc1
)
. Given that xPc2y for all y ∈ max
(
S; Pc1
)
,
we have xPc2y for all y ∈ max
(
S; Pc′1
)
. This implies x = c(Pc′1 ,Pc2) (S).∣∣∣∣P2 (Pc1; c)∣∣∣∣ = 1 follows from the construction of P1. Q.E.D.
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